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Europe went on vacation this month, but not before dealing with one of 
the heaviest work loads the  Community has faced  since  its  inception. 
While rushing through important decisions to meet the July  1 deadline 
for customs union, it was faced with a new challenge to European unity: 
the economic crisis in France. EUROPEAN  coMMUNITY  this month con-
tains  a  summary  and chronology  of  the  events  between  June 25  and 
July 23 which  illustrate the complexities  of the political process which 
led to a joint Community effort to assist France in its current difficulties. 
As in the United States, Europe this fall faces the trauma of elections. 
In this issue,  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  surveys the major political parties 
in the Six. Paul van Ypersele de Strihou reviews the history of the Chris-
tian Democratic parties; Roger Morgan, the Social Democrats; and Mur-
ray Forsyth, the Liberal parties. 
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catini-Societlz Generale  per  l'Industria Mineraria  e Chimica, Italy. 
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and National Interests 
THE COMMUNITY DEALS  WITH FRENCH  CRISIS 
Following the emergency situation in which France found itself 
as the result of the events in May, the French Government an-
nounced that it planned to take a series of measures to solve the 
economic and social problems facing the country. However, the 
interpenetration of the  economies of the  Six no longer allows 
a single state to  act alone.  The European Communities Com-
mission saw the dangers and the challenge inherent in the situ-
ation. It promptly moved to set into motion the procedures pro-
THE COMMUNITY in July broke new legal and procedural ground. 
For the first  time since the Treaty of Rome came into force, 
on January 1,  1958, it was  called upon  to  apply Article  108, 
which deals with the action a member state may take when con-
fronted with balance-of-payments difficulties.  It did  so  under 
particularly unfavorable conditions calling for quick decisions, 
following the emergency situation in France during May. 
Ever since early June, when the first evaluations of the eco-
nomic and social consequences of the French events were made 
public, France's partners realized that the French Government 
would be forced to ask for assistance from the Community; and 
the feeling prevailing in Brussels and in the Community capitals 
was that some kind of assistance ought to be granted. This ac-
tion v  ..  :~s  also seen as  a meaningful way to deter France from 
postponing the tariff cuts scheduled for July 1-those due both 
for the completion of the customs union and the first stage of the 
Kennedy Round. Others feared a devaluation of the franc. 
French Announce Emergency Measures 
On June 25,  the French Government submitted to  the  Com-
mission of the European Communities a document indicating 
the measures which it planned to take to meet the difficulties in-
herent in the French economic situation.  Contrary to general 
expectations,  the  French did  not  request  the  application  of 
Article 226 of the Treaty, but referred in a general way to the 
Treaty provisions allowing particular, urgent action in the event 
of economic difficulties. Thus without specifically saying so, the 
French Government referred its action in particular to Article 
109 of the Treaty, which says that when a sudden crisis in the 
balance of payments occurs, "the member state concerned may 
provisionally take the necessary safeguard measures," and that 
"the Commission and the other member states shall be informed 
of such measures ...  not later than at the time of their entry 
into force." The announced measures consisted of import quotas 
in certain particularly sensitive sectors, import controls in a few 
vided by the  Common Market  Treaty,  striving  to  make sure 
that the French measures did not jeopardize the interests of the 
other members or the development of the  Community.  Thus, 
a series of consultations and meetings  were  held in Brussels 
which eventually led to a joint Community effort to assist France 
in its current difficulties. 
The following  is a summary and chronology of the  events 
which took place between June 25 and July 23 
other sectors, and some export subsidies aimed at balancing the 
new  wage  increases.  Import restrictions  would  affect  mostly 
member countries and only to a very limited extent the United 
States  and other third countries.  France assured  its  partners 
that all measures were temporary and that the tariff cuts sched-
uled for July 1 would be implemented. 
FRENCH MEASURES 
QUOTAS 
Temporary quotas starting July 1  to limit the increase of French 
imports in relation to 1967 base periods: 
•  passenger cars, effective July 1-November 1, 1968, 15 per cent 
above the corresponding 1967 level 
•  other motor vehicles, effective July 1-November 1, 1968, a  10 
per cent increase over the same period in 1967 
•  refrigerators,  washing machines,  and gas  cooking ranges,  total 
1968 imports to be 10 per cent over total 1967 imports 
•  textiles, permitted increases to vary for each product with 1967 
as the base period 
•  steel,  59,000  long tons per month until December 31,  1968,  7 
per cent higher than monthly imports during the second half of 1967. 
EXPORT INSURANCE 
Continuation of its export insurance system, which was to be elimi-
nated on July 1, on eligible exports to all destinations until January 1, 
1969.  This  system  protects  against  cost  increases  on  machinery 
requiring a long lead-time in production. The Government, in addi· 
tion, added new categories of equipment to be covered and lowered 
the floor for eligibility from $200,000 to $20,000. 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
Temporary export subsidies  on industrial products  to  compensate 
for  the  increase  of  wages  following  the  May-June  disturbances. 
The basic rate of compensation was set at 6 per cent for the period 
July 1-0ctober 31, 1968, and 3 per cent for November 1, 1968-
January 31, 1969.  3 4 
EXPORT CREDIT RATES 
As an additional measure to encourage export sales, a lower prefer-
ential rediscount rate for export credit, from 3 per cent to 2 per cent. 
The reduced rate would apply for the full life of the credits (up to 
five  years)  extended  under  export  contracts  concluded  between 
June 28 and December 31,  1968. For contracts prior to June 28, 
the 3 per cent rate would continue to apply. 
ARTICLE 109 
1.  Where  a  sudden crisis in  the  balance  of payments occurs and 
if a decision, within the meaning of Article 108, paragraph 2, is not 
immediately taken, the member state concerned may provisionally 
take the necessary safeguard measures. Such measures shall cause 
the least possible  disturbance  in the  functioning  of the  Common 
Market  and shall not  exceed  the  minimum  strictly  necessary  to 
remedy the sudden difficulties which have arisen. 
2.  The Commission and the other member states shall be informed 
of such safeguard measures not later than at the time of their entry 
into force. The Commission may recommend to the Council mutual 
assistance under the terms of Article 108. 
3.  On the basis of an opinion of the  Commission and after con-
sulting the Monetary Committee, the Council, acting by means of 
a qualified majority vote, may decide that the state concerned shall 
amend, suspend, or abolish the safeguard measures referred to above. 
ARTICLE 226 
1.  In the course of the transitional period, where there are serious 
difficulties  which  are likely  to persist  in  any  sector  of economic 
activity •.• a member state may ask for authorization to take safe-
guard measures to restore the situation. • • . 
2.  At the request of the state concerned, the Commission shall ••. 
immediately determine the safeguard measures which  it considers 
necessary, specifying the conditions and particulars of application. 
3.  The measures authorized under paragraph 2 may include deroga-
tions from the provisions of this Treaty  •••• Priority shall be given 
in the choice of such measures to those which will least disturb the 
functioning of the Common Market. 
No  Precedent, No  Clear Guidelines 
The content of the import restrictions seemed fairly moderate. 
As for export subsidies,  these could  be  questioned,  but their 
limited  duration was seen as  a positive factor.  Consequently, 
critics questioned the procedure followed much more than the 
substance of the measures. And although some argued that the 
foregoing  measures  and  procedure  were  in  accord  with  the 
Treaty of Rome,  in  a  strictly legal  sense,  the  announcement 
took the Commission and the Five by surprise. Did France have 
the right to decide, unilaterally, that there was a "sudden crisis" 
in its balance of payments? Opinions differed. The Treaty does 
not offer clear guidelines and there was no precedent to which 
the Community could refer. All these factors contributed to the 
uncertainity of the situation. On one hand, Community cireles 
acknowledged that the French measures were reasonable. There 
could be little doubt that such measures would have been con-
siderably more far-reaching had the French Government been 
able to act freely, without the legal obligations,  as  well  as  the 
economic  and  political  considerations,  which  stemmed  from 
France's membership in the Community. Yet, it was regretted 
that France had not consulted with its partners before announc-
ing its plans. In any case, the opinion in Community circles was 
that it was absolutely vital,  to prevent the system from being 
seriously shaken and to  avoid establishing a dangerous prece-
dent,  that no member country should be  allowed  to  act uni-
laterally on matters which were relevant to the Community as 
a whole. 
Quick Action by the Commission 
On June 28, after close examination of the French document 
and following two days of around-the-clock deliberations, the 
Commission made the following statement: 
"The Commission fully  appreciates the confirmation of the 
French Government's determination to observe the July 1 dead-
line, and it is aware of the efforts made by the French Govern-
ment to restrict the safeguard measures. 
Members of the European Communities Commission consult with the Council in Brussels on July  5.  On the agenda: measures proposed by 
the French  Government to protect  its  steel industry  in  the  wake of the  May  events  which  disrupted  the  French  economy.  Front  left  to 
right: Guido Colonna di Paliano and Albert Coppe,  members of the  Commission; Commission President Jean  Rey, and Commission  Vice 
President Raymond Barre. The French delegation at the July  5 Council meeting: Ambassador 
J-M.  Roegner,  permanent  representative  to  the  Community,  and 
Albin Chalandon, Minister of Industry. 
"However, the Commission doubts whether the French Gov-
ernment will alone be  able to take all  the safeguard measures 
announced and thinks that, in any case, the Community pro-
cedures should be referred to without delay. 
"Therefore, before pronouncing finally on the measures an-
nounced,  the Commision is  opening the procedure of Article 
108 requesting the calling of a Council meeting. 
"The Commission has  also  decided  to  begin  the  consulta-
tions provided for by the Treaty of Paris with regard to  steel 
products." 
Thus, the Commission set into motion the Community pro-
cedures.  Meanwhile,  the  French  Government  had  indicated 
that it was  prepared to  examine  the  problems raised  by the 
measures,  at a  Community Council session  to be held  at the 
earliest possible date. 
Steel: A Special Case 
The most urgent problem was that of steel import restrictions 
because the Treaty of Paris bans limiting imports of European 
Coal and Steel Community products from other member .coun-
tries.  Only  if there  are  "fundamental  and  persistent  disturb-
ances" in the economy of a member state can the Commision, 
after consulting the Council, recognize the existence of such a 
situation and then decide the measures to be taken to  end it, 
while safeguarding the Community's vital interests (Article 37 
of ESCS  Treaty).  The  French  Government  bowed  to  these 
rules. Consequently, while the other measures it had announced 
were put into effect on July 1, it withheld its decision with regard 
to steel imports and declared that it would accept the decision 
of the Commission.  On July 5,  the Commission, having con-
sulted  the  ECSC  Consultative  Committee  and  the  Council, 
authorized the French Government to grant French steel firms 
certain  aids  until  January  31,  1969,  and  to  take  during the 
period July 8-December 31, 1968, measures to limit deliveries 
of steel  products into France.  The Commission  took this  de-
cision in spite of strong reservations from some member gov-
ernments. It also decided that it would re-examine the overall 
situation on October 15, 1968, at the latest. 
Community Grants  "Mutual  Assistance" 
Also on July 5,  the Commission informed the French Govern-
ment about the various measures which, according to the Com-
mission's evaluation of the situation, France ought to take, in 
addition to those already taken unilaterally under Article  104 
of the Treaty. Thereafter, the  Commission decided  to  submit 
to  the  Council  a  formal  recommendation  to  grant  France 
"mutual assistance"  (Article  108  of the Treaty).  The Com-
mission's  proposal stated that "a prolonged  disequilibrium of 
the French economy may undermine the cohesion of the Com-
munity, at the very time when the interpenetration of the six 
member countries' economies is steadily increasing, and partic-
ularly now that an important step has been made towards  the 
creation of an economic union and the implementation of com-
mon policies. The French problems must be  solved in a spirit 
of Community solidarity, by abiding by the rules of the Treaty 
and using the means which it provides." 
ARTICLE  104 
Each member state shall pursue the economic policy necessary to 
ensure the  equilibrium  of its  overall  balance of payments and to 
maintain confidence in its  currency, while ensuring a high level of 
employment and the stability of the level of prices. 
ARTICLE  108 
1.  Where a  member state is  in difficulties  or seriously  threatened 
with difficulties as regards its balance of payments ••. and where 
such difficulties are likely ...  to prejudice the functioning  of the 
Common Market .•. the Commission shall without delay examine 
the situation of such state and the action which • . • that state has 
taken or may take in conformity with the provisions of Article 104. 
The Commission shall indicate the measures which it recommends 
that the state concerned adopt. 
If the  action  taken  by  a  member state  and  the  measures sug-
gested by the Commission do not prove sufficient to overcome the 
difficulties encountered or threatening, the Commission shall, after 
consulting  the  Monetary  Committee,  recommend  to  the  Council 
the  granting  of  mutual  assistance  and  the  appropriate  methods 
therefor  ..•. 
2.  The Council, acting by means of a qualified majority vote, shall 
grant mutual assistance ....  Mutual assistance may take the form, 
in particular, of: 
(a)  concerted  action  in  regard  to  any  other  international  or-
ganisations to which member states may have recourse; 
(b)  any measures necessary  to avoid  diversions  of commercial 
traffic  where  the  state  in  difficulties  maintains  or  re-establishes 
quantitative restrictions with regard to third countries; or 
(c)  the granting of limited credits by other member states, subject 
to the agreement of the latter. 
Furthermore, during  the  transitional  period,  mutual  assistance 
may also take the form of special reductions in customs duties or 
enlargements of quotas •.• subject to the agreement of the states 
by  which such measures should have to be taken. 
3.  H  the  mutual  assistance  recommended  by  the  Commission  is 
not granted by the Council or if the mutual assistance granted and 
the measures taken are insufficient, the Commission shall authorize 
the state in difficulties to take safeguard measures of which the Com-
mission shall determine the conditions and particulars. 
Such authorization may be revoked and such conditions and par-
ticulars  may  be  amended  by  the  Council acting  by  means  of  a 
qualified majority vote.  5 6 
The Council of Ministers met on July 20 to discuss and vote 
a directive granting mutual assistance to France on the basis 
of the Commission's recommendation. The directive stated that 
the member states other than France shall adopt all measures 
necessary: 
•  to achieve high growth rates without jeopardizing the stabil-
ity of their economies and, should growth prove too slow, to in-
troduce an expansionary policy 
•  to  pursue a policy of interest-rate stabilization 
•  to  allow,  as  far  as  possible,  the  flotation  on  their  capital 
markets of loans contracted by French borrowers 
•  to  adopt, within the framework of Community decisions,  a 
common  attitude  in  discussions  and  exchanges  of  views  on 
France's situation held in international economic organizations, 
such as  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, the General Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade, and 
the International Monetary Fund. 
The directive also pointed out that, in the monetary field, the 
member states had already participated in the financing  of a 
drawing made by France on the International Monetary Fund 
early in  June  and  in  the  granting  of  short-term  credit  lines 
opened for the Bank of France by major central banks. 
At the same meeting,  the Council of Ministers also  had an 
exchange of views  on the measures  already taken and imple-
mented by France. All delegations recognized  the exceptional 
nature of the French situation and the soundness of the Corn-
mission recommendation, and agreed on the principle of mutual 
assistance. However, there was serious concern in the Council 
over the French measures that had already gone into effect. As 
the Commission was solely responsible for a decision on these 
measures and since  it had not yet taken any action on them, 
some  delegations  raised reservations with  regard to the prin-
ciple  of quotas.  All  delegations  attached  great importance to 
the temporary nature of the measures. The French delegation 
emphasized that they were all strictly limited in time and that 
they represented the minimum safeguard allowable,  especially 
in view of the effort made to observe the July 1 deadlines in a 
critical situation. 
Commission "Corrects"  French  Measures 
On July 22 and 23, the Commission again met to  examine the 
French situation.  It did  so  on the  basis  of Article  108  ( 3), 
since the "insufficiency" of the measures adopted by the Coun-
cil in the framework of mutual assistance was generally recog-
nized. Here, the difficulties carne from the fact that the French 
Government had already adopted a series of measures, and im-
plemented some of them. Consequently, the Commission had to 
decide if each measure were justified  and  consistent with the 
functioning of the Common Market. 
In its  decision,  which  was  formally  handed to  the  French 
Government on July 23, the Commission authorized France to 
implement  the  measures  which  it  had  announced.  However, 
several correctives were introduced,  mainly to  protect the in-
terests of the other member countries. Most of the correctives 
changed the  base periods and enlarged the quotas for various 
products. For instance, the base period for household equipment 
was changed from all of 1967 to the second half of 1967; simi-
larly the quota would apply only to the second half of 1968, in-
stead of the whole year. These changes considerably improved 
the  export possibilities  of the other five  countries,  especially 
Italy, since imports during the first half of 1968 had already in-
creased sharply over the same period in 1967. The same consid-
erations applied to textile imports.  In one case  (carded wool) 
the  Commission did not authorize the  quotas because it said 
that structural weaknesses  rather than  short-term trends  had 
caused the difficulties in the industry. The Commission said it 
would follow  the French economic situation closely  and reex-
amine it no later than October 15.  Moreover, the Commission 
reserved the right to amend or abrogate its decision if the meas-
ures created serious difficulties for another member state. 
The Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers met in Brussels on July  20 and adopted a directive granting France "mutual assistance." Christian Democratic Parties 
in the Community 
by  PAUL VAN  YPERSELE  DE  STRIHOU 
EVALUATION  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  DEMOCRATIC  PARTIES'  present 
and future positions on the political chessboard of the European 
Community's member countries must begin by a careful exam-
ination of party developments from a time when they all  had 
something  in  common.  A  handy reference  point is  the  year 
1945 when every Christian party demonstrated the will to break 
with the  past  and  rebuild  on new  foundations.  For some  of 
these  parties-the  French  Popular  Republican  Movement 
( MRP),  the  Dutch Christian  parties,  and  the  Belgian  Social 
Christian Party (Psc)-this new orientation was motivated by 
the general upheaval following four years of war and foreign 
occupation. The German Christian Democratic Union  (  CDU) 
and the Italian Christian Democrats  (DC) , in addition, had to 
fill  the  internal  political  vacuum  caused  by  years  of stifling 
totalitarianism. 
If, on the whole, these parties managed to turn over a new 
leaf by taking advantage of a coincidence of circumstances, it 
was  because there were imaginative politicians in their ranks, 
men  who  had reached maturity in reflection  during years  of 
silence under the enemy. Under the leadership of men such as 
a de Gasperi in Italy and an Adenauer in Germany, the Chris-
tian Democrats were to  play down  their old  role  as  society's 
foremost defenders of religious  interests. 
Immediate Success 
Without discarding the Christian beliefs that would still underlie 
their programs, the Christian Democratic parties, nevertheless, 
minimized religious issues. Of course, the extent of party "secu-
larization" varied from  one  country to  another.  In any case, 
they became mass-parties, sensitive to the economic and social 
issues of the day. The diversity of the electorate they cultivated 
naturally placed them politically in the center, though an under-
current of reform did run through their programs. 
Their success was immediate. Elections in Italy, Benelux, and 
Germany  gave  them  first  place  with  30-40  per  cent  of the 
ballots. In France, even the MRP  saw its influence grow stead-
ily. From then on-and this element was another one common 
to all the Christian Democratic parties-they became the figure-
head party in coalition governments.  Everywhere, throughout 
Western Europe, they bore the responsibilities of almost con-
tinuous power in the following years. At times in Germany, and 
occasionally in Italy and Belgium, governing power was exer-
cised by the Christian Democrats alone, without any coalition. 
Thus,  to  the  Christian Democrats  Western  Europe  owes  its 
greatest debt for rapid economic recovery and relative political 
stability, despite a few ups and downs. 
Platform with a "European" Dimension 
The Christian Democrats' most important contribution during 
this period was, however, that they gave their platform a "Euro-
pean" dimension.  Once the initial temptation to keep the de-
feated  German  and  Italian  nations  subordinated  by  a  new 
"Versailles Treaty" had been overcome,  it was the Christian 
Mr.  van  Ypersele  de  Strihou,  a  member of Belgium's Social 
Christian Party, was special assistant to Belgian Prime Minister 
Theo  Lefevre  from  1961-65,  and is  scientific  adviser  at  the 
Brussel's Center of Socio-political Research  and Information. 
Most of former  German Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard's rallies 
in  July  1966  in  North  Rhine-Westphalia  were  held out of doors, 
under  banners  proclaiming  "For  Our  State-For  Our  Times-
CDU".  PHOTO:  Courtesy  of the  German  Information Center,  New 
York. 
Democrats who chose to win acceptance for a spirit of cooper-
ation instead of one of bitterness. 
These pioneers found a natural leader in Konrad Adenauer, 
who became the first president of the CDU  in 1946 and Chan-
cellor three years later. The decisive Franco-German reconcili-
ation  thus  became  possible,  the  needle's  eye  through  which 
European unification had to pass or fail. This new approach to 
intra-European relations took concrete form in the Paris Treaty 
creating the European Coal and Steel Community. All of the 
signatories were Christian Democratic cabinet members. 
The same "European" conviction coupled with tireless efforts 
to achieve a more just social order at the national level consti-
tuted the two  most outstanding signs  of the Christian Demo-
crats' presence in the post-war governments. 
Enthusiasm Scattered by Diversity 
What is  the prognosis for the Christian Democratic parties in 
the Europe of the Six this year? Do they still have the initial 
enthusiasm that enabled them to carry out quasi-revolutionary 
plans just a short time ago? The answer must be generally nega-
tive. No matter what attributes each party may have, no matter 
how strong their respective national positions, all of them are 
suffering from an ailment that defies diagnosis. However, there 
are signs that one of the main causes of their earlier success-
their diversity-is working against them today. 
With  so  many different  types  of supporters,  the  Christian 
Democratic  parties  are  finding  it  more  difficult  today  than 
before to  heal internal conflicts and the resulting splits. These 
disagreements have always been present, but latent. Once they 
could have  been overcome, or at least diluted,  by  the natural  7 8 
consensus inherent in their sociologically homogeneous Chris-
tianity, but now this bond is  beginning to disappear. Through-
out Europe churches are moving towards political disengage-
ment while  the  revival of regional and ethnic traits is  moving 
in the same direction. As a result, special interest groups within 
the parties are tempted to form factions, which sometimes act 
like separate parties. Thus, it is not surprising that the Christian 
Democrats' progressive stratification into social (peasant, labor, 
and middle class)  or linguistic interest groups has encouraged 
rigidity in their political thought and activities. For this reason, 
young voters find  less  satisfactory answers to their aspirations 
today than they  used to.  Recent election returns in Italy and 
Belgium  and  current  events  in  the  Netherlands  adequately 
illustrate this point. Still, though questions are being raised from 
every side about the Christian Democratic parties' basic tenets 
and reasons for existence, they could remain a major factor in 
their countries' political life for years to come, but only if they 
have  the  courage  to  make some decisions  about their future 
orientation. 
The Parties as an International Force 
Before  1940,  no  one  had thought of the  European Christian 
Democratic Parties working together; contacts between leaders 
of the  national  parties  had been  on a purely personal  basis. 
Only in  1948  did  international cooperation become  a  reality 
with  the  creation  of  the  Nouvelles  Equipes  lnternationales 
(NEI), now called the International Union of Christian Demo-
crats.  This  international  organization,  or  club,  of  Christian 
Democrats was  formed for discussion  and comparison of the 
national governments' programs and experiences. A. de Schry-
ver, a Belgian, was its first president. What brought about this 
change? The reasons  already given:  the  rise  of the Christian 
Democratic parties in their respective countries, the discovery 
of the  European perspective, the importance surrounding the 
Franco-German  reconciliation.  The  existence  of  the  NEI 
helped to establish the respectability of the German cou, while 
"European" objectives, developed by politicians from various 
countries, were scrutinized before being broached at the official 
level  of ministerial  conferences. 
In the sixties,  the Christian Democratic parties' evident de-
sire to  cooperate was to  eventually extend their influence be-
yond  the  European continent.  The implantation of Christian 
social ideas in Latin America was encouraged, and judging by 
its  rapid  progress,  especially  in Chile,  Peru,  and  Venezuela, 
found fertile ground there. 
Now,  after twenty  years,  does  the  International  Union  of 
Christian Democrats still perform its original functions? Para-
doxically perhaps, the  very fact that the Christian Democrats 
have exercised ministerial responsibilities almost without inter-
ruption has decreased the importance of dialogue at party level. 
Moreover, in  view of the increasingly technical turn of "Euro-
pean" problems, different organizations, such as  the Christian 
Democratic Group in  the  European Parliament, have proven 
better equipped to debate them.  Nevertheless, through annual 
congresses,  periodic meetings,  and the great presidents that it 
has  elected-one, Theo Lefevre  Belgian  Prime  Minister;  an-
other, Secretary General of the  Italian  Christian  Democrats 
Mariano  Rumor - the  International  Union  could  remain  a 
choice place for comparing different viewpoints and, above and 
beyond that, for finding common ground. 
Billboards and election propaganda in  Baria, Italy, May 1953. On the  left,  the  Christian  Democrats attack  the  Communist  unions  (CGIL) 
for  the  way they defend the interests of civil servants.  The  middle board is  that of the Movimento Sociale Italiano, a neo-jascist party, and 
the board on the right that of the Italian  Communist Party  (PCI).  PHOTO: Courtesy of the Italian Information Center, New York. Social Democrat Parties 
by  Roger Morgan 
SOCIAL  DEMOCRATIC  PARTIES,  representing  various  shades  of 
socialist opinion, play an important part in the political life of 
the countries of the European Community. 
These parties normally win  between one-fifth and two-fifths 
of the votes at elections. They have often taken part in coalition 
governments  in  the  main countries-in France in  the  1940's 
and 1950's, in Germany since 1966, and in Italy and the Bene-
lux countries for a great part of the post-war period. The names 
of their leaders have been among the household words of post-
war  Europe--Guy Mollet,  the  French  Prime  Minister,  and 
Gaston Defferre the challenger to de Gaulle, Willy Brandt the 
German Social Democratic Party leader and current Foreign 
Minister,  and  Paul-Henri  Spaak,  the  former  Belgian  Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister whose work for European inte-
gration earned him the name of "Mr. Europe." 
Most of the Social Democratic parties of industrial Western 
Europe were founded in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury and many of them are still in  theory committed, like the 
British Labour Party, to fairly revolutionary programs radically 
challenging the capitalist economic system. Their political ex-
perience in  the last 20 years,  however,  and particularly their 
failure in  most cases to  win  an absolute  majority, have  often 
made  them play down  the  more  controversial  items  of their 
program-the commitment to  Marxism, or to  nationalization 
-so as to allow the formation of coalition governments which 
were their only way to a share of power. 
Another reason  for  the  dilution  of strongly socialist  party 
programs has been that the Social Democratic parties of West-
ern Europe, in varying degrees, have attempted to  widen their 
electoral appeal from the industrial working class, their original 
source of support, to both rural voters and white-collar workers. 
The  retreat  from  dogmatic  Marxism  and  the  attempt  to 
broaden the basis of electoral support have evolved  in  differ-
ent ways in the various countries of the Six. 
Germany: The SPD 
The Social Democratic Party of Germany  (SPD)  claims  first 
consideration, partly because it is the oldest (founded in 1863) 
and partly because it now seems to occupy a position of un-
precedented strength in the political life of its country. At the 
last general election in  1965, the sPD  won  nearly 40 per cent 
of the votes  (its share has gone up by 3-4 per cent at every 
election since 1963).  •:• 
This electoral show of strength put the party in a good posi-
tion to take advantage of conflicts which broke out in the ruling 
Christian  Democratic  Party  under  Chancellor  Adenauer's 
successor, Ludwig Erhard. At the end of 1966 these  conflicts 
led to the formation of a coalition government, in  which the 
SPo's  leaders hold several prominent positions:  Willy  Brandt, 
the  Party  Leader,  is  Vice-Chancellor  and  Foreign  Minister; 
Herbert Wehner,  for  several  years  the  Party's administrative 
head, occupies the important ministry of All-German Affairs; 
Professor Karl Schiller,  who  was  in charge  of the  economic 
affairs of Berlin when Willy Brandt was its mayor, is now Fed-
eral Minister of Economics, and other members of the  Party 
•:•  ED. NOTE: In the Baden-Wuerttemburg regional elections on April 
28,  1968,  however,  this  trend  was  reversed,  and  the  SPD  share 
dropped from 37.3 per cent of the ballots cast in 1964 to 29 per cent. 
head the Ministries of Social Welfare and of Transport, as well 
as other ministries. 
The SPD's  decision  to  enter a  coalition with  the  Christian 
Democrats  was  the  logical  conclusion  of a  slow  but steady 
evolution towards the Right.  The Party was  for many years 
officially  committed to a  Marxist revolutionary program.  Al-
though  it  joined  in  several  coalition  governments  under the 
Weimar Republic ( 1919-33), its commitment to all-out social-
ism was, if anything, reinforced by the experience of persecu-
tion  and exile  its  leaders  underwent during the Third Reich. 
The  Party's  first  postwar  leader,  Kurt  Schumacher  ( 1895-
19 52), who had spent 11  of the 12  years of the Hitler period 
in concentration camps, spoke up intransigently after the war 
for a  socialist economic policy,  and against many  aspects  of 
the economic and foreign policy of Chancellor Adenauer. 
After Schumacher's death, the SPD  was led for a number of 
years by Erich Ollenhauer (1900-63), an honorable but rather 
colorless  man,  under whose leadership it suffered  disappoint-
ments  in  the  federal  elections  of 1953  and  1957.  After the 
second of these, the Party went through an internal shake-up 
which resulted in big changes both in program and leadership. 
Drastic Shift 
The new policy statement of the SPD, adopted after long debates 
at  the  Party Congress in  Bad Godesberg in  19 59,  threw  out 
much  of the  radical  Marxist phraseology of the  earlier  pro-
gram,  replacing  it with  a  clear commitment  to  a  moderate 
policy of support for private enterprise, for precise but limited 
social reform proposals, and for the Christian Church (an im-
portant  point  in  a  country  where  religious  and  philosophi-
cal  Weltanschauungen  have  regularly  inflamed  political  ar-
guments). 
This  drastic  shift  in  the  spo's  social  and  economic  policy 
was followed in 1960 by a clear statement that in foreign policy 
the party would move  nearer to the line already taken by the 
Adenauer government, which the SPD had thus far strongly op-
posed. 
In terms  of personalities,  the  SPD  went into the  1961  and 
1965  elections with  a new "Chancellor candidate," the popu-
lar and dynamic Mayor of West Berlin Willy Brandt. He was 
backed  by  an  impressive  Shadow  Cabinet,  including  Fritz 
Erler, the spokesman on foreign policy  (whose death in  1967 
was tragic for his party at the time of its greatest success) ; the 
defense  expert Helmut Schmidt  (former Minister  of the  In-
terior of the City State of Hamburg, and current chairman of 
the SPD  parliamentary party in Bonn), and several others who 
had made their names by successful administration of the large 
towns and states of the Federal Republic. 
In  electoral terms,  this  change of platform  and  leadership 
paid off handsomely. Controversy still continues within the SPD 
about whether the party was right to enter the coalition instead 
of allowing the previous government to take the full  blame for 
its own mistakes, or whether its decision was a statesmanlike act 
that helped to save the Federal Republic from the dangers of 
economic  stagnation  and  the  rising  threat  of  the  National 
Democratic Party. Either way, however, the sPD has established 
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its right to be regarded as one of the major political forces of 
the Federal Republic. 
France: The SFIO 
In France, although the tradition of socialist political thought 
and  action  is  strong, the situation of the democratic socialist 
party is  much less  promising than in  Germany.  The French 
Socialist Party  (whose official  name is  French Section of the 
Workers' International-SFIO) has to fight  for its share of the 
left-wing vote against two powerful rivals-to its left the Com-
munist  Party  which  regularly  wins  between  20  and  25  per 
cent of the votes at elections and to its right the radical liberals 
who accept some points of socialist policy but not all of them 
and who in recent elections have won about 1  0 per cent of the 
votes.  This means that the sFio, which in recent elections has 
won only about  12  per cent of the  votes,  can only  make  its 
weight felt politically by entering an alliance either to the left 
or to the right.  At present it is  connected with its right-hand 
neighbor,  the Radical Party, in  the Federation of the  Demo-
crats and Socialist Left  ( FGDS),  though it still  looks  leftward 
occasionally  towards  the  possibility  of  cooperation  with  the 
Communists as well. 
Under the Fourth Republic, before General de Gaulle's re-
turn to power in 1958, the French Socialist Party provided the 
leadership in several coalition governments. In the early post-
war years, under its veteran leader Leon Blum and a new gen-
eration of leaders including Daniel Mayer, Jules Moch, and Guy 
Mollet  (who became the party's General Secretary in  194  7), 
the  SFIO  took the lead with its coalition allies in nationalizing 
basic industries and creating a modern system of social services. 
Guy Mollet, who remains General Secretary of a party after 
a record 21  years in that position, also holds the record for the 
duration of a government under the unstable conditions of the 
Fourth Republic. The government he formed in January 1956, 
after an electoral swing to the left, lasted nearly 18 months. It 
carried  through  several  reform  measures,  including  the  in-
crease in holidays with pay from two to three weeks a year; but 
it  came  to  grief  over  the  problem  of Algerian  nationalism, 
which Mollet had tried to settle by building up French military 
strength in  Algeria  and  by  carrying  out the  Suez  operation 
against Egypt. Early in 1957, before the government fell,  Mol-
let's  foreign  secretary,  Christian  Pineau,  signed  the  Rome 
Treaty, the foundation for the next steps forward in European 
integration. 
Less Doctrinaire 
The SFIO  was  swept to  one side, like the other parties of the 
Fourth Republic, by the Gaullist upsurge of 1958.  In the ten 
years since then, the party has recovered some of its  strength 
and now forms  an important part of the main parliamentary 
opposition group, the Federation of the Left. Guy Mollet and 
some of the older socialist leaders remain attached to the Marx-
ist concepts of the 1930's (the SFIO has not thought of adopting 
anything like the spo's Godesberg program-partly because this 
could be denounced by the Communists as  a complete sell-out 
of socialism),  but other  leaders  of the  democratic  left  have 
made an impact as less doctrinaire men of action. They include 
Gaston Defferre,  who has made a considerable  reputation as 
(continued after index) 
Giuseppe Saragat mayor  of  Marseilles  and  in  1965  appeared  likely  to  be  the 
candidate of  the united left against President de  Gaulle,  and 
more recently Fran<;:ois  Mitterand, a member of a  small left-
wing  party and  an  ex-minister  of the  Fourth  Republic,  who 
achieved a remarkable feat in the presidential election of De-
cember 1965 in preventing General de Gaulle from winning 50 
per cent of the votes. 
In  the  parliamentary general  election  of March  1967,  the 
Federation of the Left won less than 20 per cent of the votes, 
a  disappointing  result in comparison to the 50 per cent won 
by the  Gaullist Union Nationale Republicaine  (uNR).  How-
ever, the unity achieved on this occasion between socialists and 
radicals has remained intact, and the ideas and policies of dem-
ocratic socialism will  certainly count for something in France 
after de Gaulle. 
Italy: Consolidation of Socialist Parties 
In  Italy,  the  third  main  country  of  the  Community,  demo-
cratic socialism has until recently been in an even worse posi-
tion  than in  France.  There  the  socialist  movement  has  been 
split not just into two parties, Socialist versus Communist, as in 
France,  but into  three.  The Socialist  Party  itself,  which  was 
fairly strong in the immediate postwar years, in 1947 split into 
two factions.  The larger and more left-wing of these, the Ital-
ian Socialist  Party under  the  leadership  of Pietro Nenni,  re-
mained fairly close  to  the Communist Party until  1956. Since 
then, it has gradually worked its way  back towards reconcilia-
tion with the  right-wing Social Democrats. The Social  Demo-
crats, who in 1947 took the name of Social Democratic Party 
of Italy, were led  for several years by  Giuseppe Saragat, cur-
rent President of the Italian Republic; and they participated in 
several coalition governments during the 1950's. 
In the  1960's, a new period in the history of the Italian left 
began, for two main reasons: 
•  A  shift  occurred  within  the  Christian  Democratic  Party, 
preparing it for "an opening to the left," or coalition with the 
Nenni Socialists,  as  well  as  with the Social Democrats led  by 
Saragat. 
•  Nenni's own political philosophy evolved towards the right. 
After  the  general  election  of  1963,  when  both  socialist 
parties did well, a left-center coalition government was formed 
in which not only the moderate Social Democrats participated 
but also the Italian Socialist Party, including Nenni himself. The 
logical next step  was  reunification of the two socialist parties 
which had fallen out in 194 7.  Many difficulties  remained, but 
a congress in November 1966 agreed that the two parties would 
be reunified in a form which left their internal structure intact 
as  a first  step  towards full  fusion,  to  be  seriously  considered 
after the  1968 election. In the meantime, the Italian socialists 
of both persuasions have exercised some influence on the eco-
nomic and social policies of the coalition government. 
In the three smaller countries of the Community-Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg-social democracy since the 
war has had its ups and downs. Usually the Social Democratic 
parties failed to win more than a third of the votes in any elec-
tion, hence government coalitions with either Liberals or Chris-
tian Democrats. The outstanding socialist statesman from this 
part of Europe is Paul-Henri Spaak. 
Firmly European 
All Social Democratic parties in  the European Community-
no matter how far their national political situations differ or how 
far  their  traditional  Marxist  programs  need  revising-stand 
firmly behind the policy of "making Europe." For the socialist 
parties in  France and the Benelux countries this was  a natural 
decision in the early post-war years. Partly because they found 
it difficult to win power in their own countries individually and 
partly  out of  traditional  socialist  internationalism,  combined 
with a conviction that this was the best way to solve the German 
problem, socialist leaders like Mollet and Spaak were pioneers 
of European unity from  the beginning.  For the Germans, the 
decision was  more difficult, since they felt that to opt for West 
Germany's integration into Western Europe was  to  cut off the 
possibility of reunification with the East; but by the late 1950's 
they had come round to the view that Western European unity 
was the right path for Germany. 
The Social Democratic parliamentarians of the Six  operate 
as  a well-organized international party group in  the European 
Parliament. They also have a permanent liaison office  in Lux-
embourg and organize regular congresses.  As  well  as  pressing 
for  greater democratic control  of the  European Community 
through the European Parliament, the Social Democratic par-
ties of the Community are firmly on record in favor of its  en-
largement to  include Britain and other applicants. Delegations 
from the Labour Committee for Europe have been warmly re-
ceived at recent congresses of the Social Democratic parties of 
the  Six,  who  look  forward  to  welcoming  the  British  Labour 
Party as a full  member of the European Parliament and of the 
political life of the Community. 
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Liberal Parties in the Community 
by MURRAY  FORSYTH 
THE LIBERAL PARTIES in the European Community are the heirs 
of parties which stood for constitutionalism, individual rights in 
the  economic and political spheres,  and secularism in school 
and state.  Many Liberal parties of the past also stood for na-
tional unity and were instrumental in creating the nation states 
of Europe as they are known today. The reasons for the decline 
of these parties need not be examined here; suffice it to say that 
they were, in a sense, destroyed by the democratic and indus-
trialized societies which they had helped to create. 
Today the Community's Liberal parties usually win between 
5 per cent and 15  per cent of the votes in national elections, 
coming in third or fourth, after the mass-parties of the right and 
left. They are concerned by roughly the same problems: whether 
to side with right or left; whether to sacrifice purity of doctrine 
for the sake of power; whether to try to become a mass-party 
like  their  rivals  or to  concentrate on representing  the  social 
groups whose views aren't expressed by the mass-parties. Most 
of their support comes from the middle strata of society, very 
little from the working class. Since the war, most of the Euro-
pean Liberal parties have participated in coalition governments. 
Except for the French Radical Party, most other Liberal parties 
reached their lowest points after the war and are now in slightly 
stronger positions. 
Which Liberal Parties Espouse Liberalism? 
There are no less than thirteen national parties and parliamen-
tary groups represented in the European Parliament's bloc of 
Liberals and allied parties. Which of them are genuine liberal 
parties? 
The situation is  relatively clear-cut in  the case of Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany; each country has 
only one Liberal party. In Italy, only the Italian Liberal Party 
(PLI)  deserves  consideration  here.  Both  of the  other Italian 
parties seated in the European Parliament's Liberal faction are 
extreme right-wing parties completely unconnected with liberal-
ism. 
The situation in France is the one that confuses the picture of 
European liberalism. The Radical Party, the party usually con-
sidered the representative of liberalism in France, has split into 
a number of factions within the French Assembly and Senate. 
Some Radical legislators have joined the Federation of the Left, 
while others have joined groups of the center-left and the center-
right. Each of these groups, except the Federation of the Left, 
is  represented  in  the  European  Parliament's  Liberal  Group. 
Beside them sit representatives of the French Independents and 
of  the  Independent  Republicans,  a  party  formed  recently 
around Valery Giscard d'Estaing,  former French Minister of 
Finance. The Independents, who emerged in the Nineteen Fif-
ties, belong to the French right and are strongly representative 
of farmers'  views.  The Independent  Republicans  have  some 
claims to be considered "liberals," despite their close links with 
Gaullism. Their views on economic matters are liberal in con-
tent,  and  they themselves  describe  their  policies  as  "liberal," 
"centrist," and "European." 
Mr.  Forsyth  is  lecturer  in  Politics  at  Leicester  University, 
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Belgium: Votes Won From the Christian Democrats 
Of all the Liberal parties in Europe, the Belgian Liberal Party 
has been the most successful in maintaining its position in the 
face of the rise of other parties. The introduction of universal 
suffrage ( 1919) and the concomitant increase in the strength of 
the Belgian Socialist Party weakened, but by no means extin-
guished,  the Belgian Liberals. Throughout the inter-war years 
the Liberals won between 14 per cent and 18  per cent of the 
votes and participated in many of the bipartite or tripartite coali-
tions which governed Belgium during that period. 
In 1945 the Belgian Liberals lost their position as third biggest 
party to the Communists; but by 1949 the Communist Party had 
faded, and the pre-war pattern re-emerged. In the elections be-
tween  1949  and 1961  the  Liberals won an average of 12 per 
cent of the votes and participated in a number of coalition gov-
ernments. In 1961  they changed their name from the Liberal 
Party to the Party for Liberty and Progress, a gesture symbolic 
of their  renunciation  of  anticlericalism.  Under  the  dynamic 
leadership in Orner Vanaudenhove the Party achieved its most 
astonishing success in 1965, when it secured 21.6 per cent of the 
votes. It  held its previous gains in the elections of 1968,' though 
it won no new ground. On a platform of national unity and a 
free market economy, the Belgian Liberals seem to have drawn 
most of their new support from the right-wing of the Christian 
Social Party, currently wracked with severe internal divisions. 
West Germany: A Tense Amalgamation 
German liberalism has long been divided. During the German 
Empire, and again during the Weimar Republic, one group of 
Liberals leaned  towards  the  right and nationalism,  while  the 
other stood firmly for individual rights, the rule of Jaw,  and a 
free economy. Under the Federal Republic both strands have 
been united in one party, the Free Democrat Party (  FDP), an 
amalgamation not always without tension.  The nationalist ele-
ment in the FDP  is  rooted primarily in Rhineland-Westphalia, 
while the more genuinely liberal elements are based in Baden-
Wlirttemburg and the Hanseatic towns. During the early years 
of the Federal Republic the conflict between the two wings was 
acute; one group wanted the FDP to become a nationalist party 
to the right of the Christian Democrats, the other wanted it to 
occupy  the  ground  between  the  Socialists  and  the  Christian 
Democrats. Today the  division has  become  more attenuated. 
Dr. Erich Mende, who was  the party chairman from 1960 to 
1967, undoubtedly helped to weld the Party together. 
The  FDP  formed  part of a  government  coalition  with  the 
Christian  Democrats  in  1949-56,  and  in  1961-66.  Today  it 
provides the opposition to both the Socialists and the Christian 
Democrats. It has taken up this role with vigor, though it seems 
recently to have lost some of its support to the GermanN  ational 
Democratic Party, the NPD, and stands in great danger from a 
current government proposal to remove the proportional meth-
od of voting from the German electoral system. 
'fhe FDP has won an average of 10 per cent of the votes in the 
general elections since 1949. It made its worst showing, 7.7 per 
cent of the votes, in 1957 and its best, 12.8 per cent, in 1961. 
There has been no  full  analysis  of  FDP  supporters,  but it is 
clearly based primarily on the more highly-educated, property-
owning strata of German society. Perhaps the most prominent A  March  1967 campaign poster: Valiry Giscard d'Estaing running 
as  an  Independent  Republican.  The  poster  reads:  "Youth and  the 
Future." PHOTO: Courtesy of the French Embassy Press and Infor-
mation Division, New York. 
personalities  of the  Party  in  the  post-war  period  have  been 
Theodor Reuss, the first President of the Federal Republic, and 
Franz BlUcher, Vice Chancellor in the first Adenauer cabinet. 
France: Shifting Splinter Groups 
Some of the difficulties  of defining liberalism in France have 
already been touched upon.  The Radical  Party,  usually  con-
sidered the embodiment of French liberal tradition, has under-
gone  a dramatic cycle  of development since the war.  Having 
dominated the Third Republic, it emerged as a mere shadow in 
1945, but gradually managed to regain its old position. Veering 
to the left and to the right as the situation demanded, the Radi-
cals  succeeded in participating in  all  the governments  of the 
Fourth  Republic  and  provided  no  fewer  than  10  of  its  21 
premiers. 
Splits, however, began to appear in the Party from 1955 on-
wards, chiefly over the policies of Pierre Mendes-France. When 
the Fourth Republic collapsed, the Radicals collapsed with it. 
In the legislative elections of 1958, they won only 2 per cent of 
the votes and suffered the worst defeat in their history. 
During the Fifth Republic the Party has splintered into va-
rious  parliamentary groups,  some  of which  have  been  short-
lived.  Its current membership  is  divided  chiefly  between  the 
Federation of the  Left,  to  which  Maurice Faure, the  former 
president of the Party now belongs, and the center-right group 
known as  the "Progress and Modern Democracy" group. The 
political beliefs of the Radicals are notoriously difficult to de-
fine. They claim to stand for the principles of the French Revo-
lution, which means in practice a strong belief in the rights of 
the individual, a strong emotional attachment to France, and a 
deep-rooted anticlericalism.  The traditional stronghold of the 
Radicals is the Midi, in the South of France. 
The present position of liberalism in France looks less bleak 
if  the  Independent Republicans,  grouped  around de  Gaulle's 
former  Finance  Minister  Giscard  d'Estaing,  are  also  treated 
as  liberals.  Apart from their designation of themselves as  lib-
erals, their ideas on economic policy provide the major justifi-
cation for such  a classification. The Independent Republicans 
favor the creation of a competitive economic system, based on 
free markets,  low tariffs,  and  stable prices.  They also  wish to 
see the French Parliament playing a bigger role in policy devel-
opment. 
The Netherlands: Two Wings 
Liberalism in the Netherlands, as in Germany, split at a  rela-
tively early date into a right and a left wing. The present Dutch 
Liberal Party, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, 
inherited the right wing tradition. Most of the left-wing liberals 
joined the Socialists after the war. 
The Dutch Liberals have participated in a number of coali-
tion  governments since  1945, including the current one.  The 
Party has  gradually  gained  in  strength,  moving from  7.9  per 
cent of the vote in  1948  to  10.7  per cent in  1967,  becoming 
the third instead of the fifth biggest Dutch party. Its main sup-
port seems to come from upper income groups, and individual 
rights  and a free  market economy are  the  main planks in its 
platform. Perhaps the most prominent figure among the Dutch 
Liberals in the post-war period has been Dirk Stikker, who was 
Secretary General of the  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
from 1961 to 1964. 
Italy: Clearly on the Right 
The Italian Liberal Party, like the Dutch, stands clearly on the 
right.  It is  financed  by  industrialists  and  attracts votes  from 
the middle and lower-middle classes. The Party's fortunes fell 
to their lowest ebb in the 1953 elections when it won only 3 per 
cent of the vote. Under the leadership of its current Secretary 
General Giovanni Malagodi,  it has now recovered part of its 
strength, winning 7 per cent of the votes in 1963 and 5.8 per 
cent in  1968. The fourth largest Italian party, it has relatively 
strong support in  the industrial centers of the North, particu-
larly  in  Milan  and Turin.  By  tradition  strongly  anticlerical, 
the Party nevertheless collaborated with the Christian Demo-
crats in the early post-war years.  When the Christian Demo-
crats  moved towards collaboration with  the  left,  the Liberals 
turned to  a policy of opposition to both the Christian Demo-
crats and the Socialists. 
European Unity 
All of the Community's Liberal parties have tended to support 
the idea of European unity,  but concrete issues have revealed 
doubt  and  division.  The German FOP,  for  example,  strongly 
supported the  creation of the  European Coal  and Steel Com-
munity in 1951, but in 1957 were the only group in the German 
Bundestag to  speak out against the  ratification of the  Rome 
Treaties creating the  Economic and Atomic Energy Commu-
nities.  Similarly,  the  French  Radical  Party  has  produced  ar-
dent Europeans such as  Maurice Faure, but also men such as 
Mendes-France who opposed France's entry into the Common 
Market.  13 14 
COMMUNITY  NEWS 
COUNCIL REACHES COMPROMISE ON TRANSPORT POLICY· 
AGREES ON RATE  BRACKET SYSTEM,  ' 
ADOPTS LABOR PROVISIONS 
The European Communities Council of Min-
isters on July  18  agreed on the  major rules 
of the  common transport policy,  a  compro-
mise  between some  member countries'  pref-
erence  for  a  regulated  market and  the  tra-
ditional preference of others for carriage by 
individual  contracts. 
The agreement was reached for the estab-
lishment  for  road transport of "rate  brack-
ets,"  the  highest and the  lowest  permissible 
transport  rates,  and  approval  was  given  to 
the  arrangement,  pending  the  Council's  ac-
ceptance  of  the  texts  in  the  four  official 
languages.  In addition,  the  Council  decided 
to apply the rules of competition to transport 
by  rail,  road,  and  inland  waterway,  and 
agreed  to  Community  norms  prescribing 
minimum  age  and  maximum  driving  times 
for  truck  drivers.  Work done  by  the  Com-
mittee  of Permanent Representatives  of the 
member  states  in  Brussels  facilitated  the 
agreement, since elections in Italy and France 
and  a  Government  crisis  in  Belgium  had 
forced cancellation of two Council transport 
meetings that had been  scheduled  for  May. 
The meeting  on July  18-19  was  the  first  on 
transport matters since the end of April. 
The Council also met on July 15 and 22-23 
(on agriculture), and on July 5 and 20 con-
cerning French balance-of-payments difficul-
ties  and  related  events  following  strikes  in 
May and June. (For details, see page 3.) Two 
more  meetings  were  scheduled  during  the 
month, on July 29 to discuss social affairs and 
on July 30 to discuss external relations. 
Competition Rules Apply to Transport 
The regulation applying the  rules of compe-
tition to transport is retroactive to July 1, the 
expiration  date of the waiver of the compe-
tition laws for this sector. The regulation pro-
hibits  any  agreement that could affect  trade 
between the member states and that has as its 
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or 
distortion of competition within the Common 
Market.  Expressly  forbidden  are:  direct  or 
indirect  fixing  of  prices  and  conditions  of 
transport; limitation or control of supply, out-
lets,  technical  development,  or  investments; 
market sharing;  applying dissimilar  rules  to 
equivalent services,  and contracts tied to the 
acceptance of auxiliary services unconnected 
with  supplying transport. 
The regulation  provides for the  following 
exceptions for agreements that: 
•  have as  their sole  purpose  and  effect  the 
application of  improved techniques or tech-
nical cooperation 
•  group small and medium-sized companies 
with  a  total  combined  capacity  of  10,000 
metric tons or less by road and 500,000 metric 
tons or less  by inland waterway 
•  benefit shippers by  improving the  quality 
of transport  services,  promoting  stability  in 
meeting  transport  needs,  improving  produc-
tivity,  or  promoting  technical  or  economic 
progress 
•  reduce  severe  and  unusual  disturbances. 
The abuse of a  dominant position  is  also 
forbidden  by  the  regulation.  Public  enter-
prises are subject to the general rules provided 
in  the  Rome  Treaty  creating  the  European 
Economic  Community.  Article  90  subjects 
public service  enterprises to  the  competition 
rules to the extent the  rules  do not prevent 
the enterprise from performing  the tasks en-
trusted to it. The Article states that trade may 
not be affected to "such a degree as would be 
contrary to the interests of the Community." 
Marked Progress in Road Transport 
A quota system for licensing transport com-
panies to haul anywhere  in  the  Community 
also met with Council approval, together with 
a  directive  providing  for  tax-free  entry  of 
fuel  in the tanks of commercial vehicles. 
•  The  quota  system  provides  for  1,200  li-
censes  for  1969-1971,  to  be  issued  by  the 
member  countries.  Belgium  receives  161, 
Germany 286, France 286, Italy 194, Luxem-
bourg  33,  and  the  Netherlands  240.  Before 
the regulation expires on December 31,  1971, 
the Commission  is to make proposals to the 
Council for the system of licensing road ship-
ments after that date. 
•  The directive on fuel provides for tax-free 
entry of 50 liters (13.21 gallons) in commer-
cial vehicles, applicable  no later than Febru-
ary 1  , 1969. Each time a substantial alignment 
of the  national  gas  and oil  taxes  occurs the 
Council will decide how much additional fuel 
in  tanks  can  be  admitted  tax-free,  until  all 
taxes on  it have been eliminated. 
The Council noted its  agreement  in  prin-
ciple on a  regulation providing for harmoni-
zation of social provisions in road transport. 
The regulation would set a minimum age of 
18  for drivers of vehicles weighing  up to 7.5 
tons,  and for other larger vehicles 21  will be 
the minimum age, except in the case of hold-
ers of professional certificates, who can qual-
ify at 18. 
Other provisions specify maximum driving 
between  rest  periods  and  maximum  driving 
times  of  50  hours  a  week  and  nine  hours 
a day.  On  long hauls, a team of two drivers 
must handle the trucks or a fresh driver must 
replace one who has driven 450 km.  between 
rest  stops.  Two years  after entry  into force, 
these  social  provisions  will  be  liberalized, 
with  the  understanding  that  this  regulation 
is  not intended to bar the enactment of more 
favorable provisions for the workers or more 
conducive  to  road safety. 
Rate  Bracket System  Agreement 
The Council noted its agreement on an obli-
gatory  bracket system of rates for transport 
of merchandise by road, valid until December 
31,  1971. The regulation can be extended for 
one year if the Council has not decided on a 
system to replace it at that time. 
According  to  the  regulation,  the  spread 
between the highest and lowest rates cannot 
exceed 23  per cent of the highest rate. Each 
rate is based on a base price to be established 
in relation to a number of specific criteria and 
can  be  modified  only  by  agreement of the 
member  states  directly  involved,  with  the 
Commission participating in the negotiations 
in a consultative capacity. Prices of carriage 
can be freely set within the limits of the rates. 
Individual  written  contracts  can  be  con-
cluded outside these  rate limits: 
•  only  under  circumstances  not  foreseen 
when the rates were set, for example, to meet 
competition,  or to fill  unusual  transport re-
quirements, but only for a limited time 
•  only if the contracts deal with a  tonnage 
of at least 500 metric tons per quarter. 
The terms of :he contract and the reasons for 
entering  into it must  be  communicated im-
mediately  to  the  competent  authorities  for 
verification  that  the  competition  rules  are 
being followed. 
In addition, the Council asked the Commis-
sion  to study the member states' systems of 
aid  to  transport  by  rail,  road,  and  inland 
waterway  and  to  make  proposals  for  their 
alignment by the end of October 1968. 
Numerous Agricultural  Decisions 
Decisions  during July,  as  had been the  case 
in  June,  affected  almost  every  agricultural 
market.  In  addition,  the  Council  passed  a 
regulation concerning payments due from the 
Guarantee Section  of the  Agriculture  Fund 
for expenditures in the first six months of the 
1967/68 accounting year. 
Fruits and Vegetables.  The Council adopted 
regulations  setting  the  base  price  and  the 
purchasing  prices  for  pears,  apples,  table 
grapes and for financing Community expendi-
tures for these products. The Council agreed 
to begin discussion of the general problem of 
intervention in fruits  and vegetables, especi-
ally apples,  during the month of September. 
Beef and veal. The Council passed the regula-
tions for applying the general rules of inter-
vention for beef,  private stocking, setting the 
levy on certain types of frozen beef, and fixing 
the orientation price from July 29,  1968, for 
veal and heavy cattle. In addition, the Council 
adopted the official  estimate of beef needed for processing between August 1 and Decem-
ber 31, 1968. 
Cereals.  The  Council  adopted  a  regulation 
modifying the basic common market organi-
zation for animal feeds with a grain base. 
Pork. The Council passed a regulation modi-
fying  the price system for  products derived 
from pork. 
Dairy.  The  Council  passed  regulations  con-
taining  general  rules  for stocking powdered 
skim milk and establishing general rules for 
intervention on the butter and cream markets 
and  the  Grana-Padano  and  Parmigiano-
Reggiano cheese market. 
In  addition,  it  adopted  a  regulation  con-
cerning the disposal of between  140,000 and 
160,000 metric tons of surplus milk.  Among 
the disposal methods mentioned in the regula-
tion were:  supplying surplus milk to certain 
processing industries and to consumers in the 
form  of concentrated  cooking  fat;  incorpo-
rating it in animal feed; and furnishing devel-
oping  countries with  milk.  The Council  ex-
pressed  its intention of continuing talks with 
the UN Food and Agriculture  Organization 
on the latter point. 
The  next  agricultural  Council  has  been 
scheduled for September 23-24. 
CRITERIA OUTLINED FOR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS 
IN LINE WITH COMMUNITIES' COMPETITION RULES 
Cooperative  agreements  that  enable  small 
and medium-sized enterprises (and sometimes 
large  firms)  to work more efficiently  in  the 
enlarged Community market are permissible 
as long as they do not enable the contracting 
parties to restrict competition inside the Com-
mon  Market  or  affect  trade  between  the 
member states. 
These  guidelines,  given  in  a  "notice"  re-
leased in Brussels on July 18 by the European 
Communities  Commission,  were  illustrated 
by three recent decisions by the Commission. 
The July  18  notice relates only to competi-
tion as  discussed in Article  85  of the Rome 
Treaty creating the European Economic Com-
munity  and  Article  65  of the  Paris Treaty 
creating the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity. Both articles forbid price fixing,  re-
strictions on production, and other restraints 
that directly or indirectly affect competition 
within  the  Common  Market.  Both  articles 
also provide exemption from the competition 
laws for agreements that make economic and 
technical  contributions  which  could  not  be 
achieved without the use of restraints 
Other Guidelines Planned 
Cooperative agreements other than the  ones 
discussed in the communication may or may 
not violate the competition rules.  The Com-
mission  said it planned to give further clari-
fication  in  other general  notices  and  specific 
decisions, since free competition is  becoming 
more and more important as the Community 
members'  economies  become  more  closely 
interconnected.  However,  since  cooperative 
ventures can facilitate  the  adaptation of en-
terprises to the realities of doing  business in 
a  large  unified  market, it felt that the types 
of  ventures  permitted  by  the  competition 
laws ought to be defined. At the moment, the 
Commission added,  no generalizations could 
be made on "abuse of a dominant position," 
forbidden  under  other  articles  of  the 
Treaties. 
In the hope of diminishing its  backlog of 
paperwork, the Commission indicated that the 
communication  should  obviate  the  need  to 
obtain  negative  clearances  for  the  types  of 
agreements discussed and so reduce the num-
ber of applications pending.  In addition,  the 
Council of Ministers meeting, Brussels, July 5.  Left  to  right: Joseph  Merlot,  Belgian Minis-
ter of Economic Affairs; Albin Chalandon,  French Minister of Industry,  Ambassador J-M. 
Roegner,  French  permanent representative  to  the  Community,  and E.M.J.A.  Sassen,  mem-
ber of the Commission. 
Commission  said  that notification  would  no 
longer be  necessary  for  agreements of these 
types,  though companes still  in doubt about 
the  legality  of  their  agreements  remained 
free to file them with the Commission if they 
so wished. 
"Notification"  provides  temporary  im-
munity  from  penalties  for  violating  Article 
85  ( 1)  of the EEC Treaty, pending the Com-
mission's advice on the legality of the Agree-
ment.  A  "negative  clearance"  is  issued  for 
agreements  that  contain  no  restrictions  on 
competition. "Exemptions" are granted those 
that do if they  make  technical  or economic 
contributions  that  could  not  be  achieved 
otherwise  and  do  not  appreciably  distort 
competition in  the Community. Notification, 
application for negative clearance, or exemp-
tion  involve  three  different  procedures;  and 
many  European  companies  have  used  all 
three,  flooding  the  Commission  with  paper. 
Joint Market Research Organizations 
The first of eight types of permissible agree-
ments treated in the communication was  the 
joint  market  research  organization,  associa-
tions formed by enterprises for the sole pur-
pose  of procuring necessary information for 
participating enterprises to make independent 
and  autonomous  determinations  of market-
ing policy. As examples of acceptable agree-
ments,  the  Commission  mentioned  agree-
ments to exchange opinions or experience, to 
make  joint market  studies  and comparative 
economic studies of enterprises and economic 
sectors, or to establish common statistics and 
projections. 
However, limitations placed on the partici-
pants' freedom of action, explicitly or by con-
certed  practice,  could  constitute  a  restraint 
of competition. As examples of unacceptable 
agreements, the Commission mentioned asso-
ciations that made specific  recommendations 
or that stated conclusions in such a way as to 
result in uniform market behavior by at least 
some of the participating enterprises. 
Information  can  be  exchanged  either  be-
tween enterprises or through the intermediary 
of a  third organization.  However,  the Com-
mission said that the distinction must be made 
between information that affects competition 
and information that does not, a difficult dis-
tinction in the case of organizations that enter 
orders,  turnover  figures,  investment  figures, 
and prices. In these instances, generalizations 
are usually impossible. A restraint on compe-
tition could occur in  an oligopolistic market 
for similar products. Calculation models con-
taining specific  rates  are regarded as  recom-
mendations that could lead to restrictions on 
competition. 
Accounting Pools, Collection Agencies 
Agreements  do  not  violate  the  competition 
rules if contracted for the sole purpose of co-
operating  on  accounting  technicalities,  pro- 15 16 
viding joint credit guarantees, or establishing 
joint  debt-collecting  agencies,  or  joint  busi-
ness or tax consulting agencies.  Cooperation 
in these  fields  does not affect  the supply of 
goods or services  or the  economic decisions 
of the  participants  and  do  not  lead  to  re-
straints on competition. 
However, a restraint on competition could 
occur in the case of a debt-collecting agency 
that does  more than execute  the  policy  de-
cisions of a participant in  the agreement. As 
examples,  the Commission mentioned agen-
cies whose work is  not confined to collecting 
outstanding payments on the instructions of a 
participant, or that influences  or sets  prices. 
Subjecting  the  participants  to  uniform  con-
ditions could constitute a concerted practice, 
just as collective comparisons of prices could. 
There  would  be  no objection  to  the  use  of 
uniform literature,  but it could  not be  con-
nected with a written or a tacit agreement on 
lmiform  prices,  rebates,  or sales  conditions. 
Working Partnerships for Filling Orders 
The competition rules do not prohibit agree-
ments for the sole purpose of creating work-
ing  partnerships  of noncompeting  firms  for 
filling  orders  or  bidding  on  products  and 
services  that  none  of  them  could  execute 
alone.  Enterprises  not  in  competition  with 
each  other  do  not  restrict  competition  by 
forming  such  associations,  especially  when 
they belong to different industries. The same 
principle applies to firms in the same industry 
to the extent that their contribution under the 
working  partnership  consists  of  supplying 
only goods or services that the other partici-
pants  cannot  supply,  whether  for  lack  of 
experience,  special  knowledge,  capacity,  or 
financial  resources,  or  because  they  cannot 
deliver  on  time.  The  determining  factor  is 
whether  or  not  the  facts  of each situation 
indicate that competition will  be possible in 
the near future  for the  products or services 
involved. If the lack of competition and the 
maintenance  of this  situation  are  based  on 
agreements or concerted practices, a restraint 
on competition could exist. If the enterprises 
agree  to  confine  their  activities  to  working 
solely  within  the  association,  a  violation 
could also occur. 
After-Sales Service and joint Sales Outlets 
The competition rules do not prohibit agree-
ments  between  noncompeting  firms  for  the 
sole purpose of creating joint sales outlets or 
after-sales service facilities. Often the forma-
tion of such associations by small or medium-
sized  competitors  does  not  have  a  marked 
effect  on  competition,  although  no  general 
criteria can be given  for  this  situation. If a 
group  of  manufacturers,  without  collusion, 
arranges for after-sales service with the same 
firm  which  is  independent,  no  violation 
occurs. 
joint Advertising Associations 
Joint advertising  is  intended to  draw the at-
tention  of  buyers  to  an  industry's  products 
or to a common brand. As such, it does not 
restrict competition. However, if the partici-
pants,  by  agreement  or  concerted  practice, 
are  partially  or completely  prevented  from 
doing  independent  advertising,  or  if  other 
restrictions  are  placed  on them,  a  violation 
may occur. 
Common Label Arrangements 
Associations  for  the  joint  use  of  a  quality 
label do not restrict competition if other com-
petitors whose  products meet objective qual-
ity  requirements can use  the  label under the 
same  conditions  as  the  members.  Quality-
control  standards,  uniform  instructions  for 
use, or use of the label for the products meet-
ing the standards do not constitute restraints 
on  competition. 
A  restraint may occur if the  right  to use 
the  label  is  tied  to  obligations  concerning 
production,  marketing,  price  fixing,  and 
other  restrictions  such  as  obliging  the  par-
ticipants to manufacture or sell only guaran-
teed-quality products. 
joint Research Agreements 
Agreements  are  also  permissible  under  the 
competition  rules  when  made  for  the  sole 
purpose  of executing  joint research and de-
velopment projects, joint placing of research 
and development contracts, and dividing proj-
ects  among  the  participating  enterprises.  In 
research,  too,  exchanging  experience  and 
data serves an information function and does 
not restrict competition. 
The same principle applies to the division 
of research and development work according 
to  the fields  involved, provided that all con-
tracting parties have  access to the  results  in 
proportion to the extent of their participation 
in the work. If, for example, a party decides 
to make a financial contribution for only one 
area of research,  refusing him access  to  re-
search  knowledge  acquired  in  another  area 
would  not  constitute  an  infraction  of  the 
competition rules. 
The following limitations could constitute 
infractions of the competition laws: 
•  restrictions on the  participants'  independ-
ent research activities 
•  failure  to accord  reciprocal  access  to the 
results  of specialized  research  entrusted  by 
the association to one or several members 
•  limitations on the use of research knowl-
edge  acquired by  the association,  in  particu-
lar, agreements to refrain from manufactur-
ing products developed in common or agree-
ment to divide up the market for production 
•  express or tacit agreement not  to  license 
third  parties  to  use  the  results  of research. 
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(However,  the  fact  that research  is  carried 
out  jointly  warrants  arrangements  to  grant 
licenses  to  third parties contingent upon the 
consent of the other participants.) 
Sharing Production, Distribution Facilities 
Agreements  that have as  their sole  purpose 
sharing  installation,  production,  stock,  and 
transport facilities are permissible  under the 
competition rules. 
These forms of cooperation do not restrict 
competition  because  they  relate  only  to or-
ganization  and  technical  arrangements.  By 
contrast,  a  restraint  on  competition  could 
occur  if  the  parties  concerned  did  not  pay 
the cost of using the installations and equip-
ment, or if concerted practices or agreements 
in  this  area  were  executed  to  split  up  the 
market or to exploit a joint enterprise. 
Size Is A Factor: "Machine Tool" Case 
The Commission decided to give  a  negative 
clearance  to  the  joint  sales  agreement  be-
tween Alliance de  Constructeurs  franr;ais  de 
Machines-Ourils of Paris and its stockholders, 
which  set up a  joint export  service  for  the 
nine  members of the company. 
The company, created in 1961, only nego-
tiates sales. The manufacturers conclude the 
sales,  set  prices,  establish  the  invoice,  and 
collect from  the  customer.  The association, 
which operates in  every  market but France, 
receives  payment only for its  marketing ex-
penses.  When the Alliance was  created,  the 
shareholders  manufactured  different  non-
competing lines of machine tools. 
For three reasons the Commission decided 
to  issue  a  negative clearance, signifying that 
the arrangement neither contains nor results 
in restraints on competition: 
•  The Alliance is  a joint export service en-
gaged only in marketing; it does not act as an 
intermediary for distribution of products. 
•  The commitment of each member to re-
frain  from  producing  or  selling  machines 
competitive  with  other  members'  product 
lines simply reflected the situation that existed 
when the Alliance was formed. Furthermore, 
the  sales  prospects for  machine tools  would 
not justify diversification, and the agreement 
tended to encourage specialization. 
•  The members, in  any case, represented  a 
relatively small slice  of the Community ma-
chine-tool market. 
Rules Apply to Buyers Too 
In a decision indicating that competition rules 
apply  to  agreements  between  purchasers  as 
well  as  between  sellers,  the  Commission 
granted  a  negative  clearance  to  the  Societe 
Commerciale et d'Etudes des Maisons d'Ali-
mentation et d'Approvisionnement a  Succur-
sales  (  SOCEMAS).  Sixty  French  retailers  of 
specialty  foods  created  the  organization  in 
1959  to  find  promising  import items for its 
members and to purchase in bulk at favor-
able  prices  if  enough  members  were  inter-
ested. The members remained free  to refuse SOCEMAS'  offers,  buy  elsewhere,  and  do  in-
dependent market prospecting. SOCEMAS' pur-
chases  represented  a  negligible  part  of  the 
Community market for the products in ques-
tion ( 1 per cent in the case of German canned 
fish).  Over a period of years,  socEMAS  con-
tinued to buy the same products and in about 
the  same  volume. 
socEMAS'  request  for  negative  clearance 
was  unopposed.  It was  granted  because  the 
organization's  activities  in  EEC  countries 
other than France were not on a sufficiently 
large  scale  to  entail  appreciable  restraints 
on competition. Article 85  of the EEC Treaty 
may, however, apply to purchasing organiza-
tions whose  activities exceed  a certain scale. 
Exemption Granted for Joint Research 
In the case of an agreement for joint research 
between S.A. Ateliers de Constructions Elec-
triques de  Charleroi  (ACEC)  of Brussels and 
the Societe Automobile Berliet of Lyons, the 
Commission decided  to  grant  an exemption 
from  the  competition  rules.  The  restraints 
imposed were necessary to fulfill the purpose 
of the  agreement-the design and marketing 
of a new type of bus with an electrical trans-
mission system. 
According to the contract,  Berliet will  be 
responsible  for  the  general  design  and me-
chanical adjustments  of a bus using an  ACEC 
electrical transmission system, adapted to the 
Berliet  vehicles.  Once  a  marketable  proto-
type has been designed,  ACEC  will supply the 
transmission and Berliet the mechanical parts 
of the  vehicle.  ACEC  will,  however,  be  free 
to  sell  its  transmissions  to  only  one  manu-
facturer  in  each  of the  four  other member 
countries  (in  addition  to  Berliet  in  France 
and  Belgian  users). 
In conjunction  with the Eurogypsum case, 
in which the Commission granted a negative 
clearance because there were no restraints on 
competition,  the  ACEC-Berliet  decision  pro-
vides guidance for European firms interested 
in  concluding joint research agreements that 
are compatible with the EEC  Treaty. 
LUXEMBOURG AGREEMENTS REPUDIATED  BY  REY 
"The Hallstein Commission and the current 
Commission have never accepted the Luxem-
bourg agreements as a fact," Jean Rey, Presi-
dent of the European Communities Commis-
sion, told the European Parliament on July 3 
during debate on actions by France to repair 
its strike-damaged economy. 
The Luxembourg agreements which ended 
the  Community  crisis  of  1965  consisted 
of  two  texts.  One,  a  four-point  document, 
stressed the intention to continue to develop 
the  Community  despite  differences  between 
five  of the member countries and France on 
the  question  of majority  voting.  The  other 
text  was  a  seven-point  list,  known  as  the 
heptalogue,  which  concerned  relations  be-
tween  the  Commission and the  Council  but 
which stopped short of reducing the Commis-
sion's exercise of its rights of initiative under 
the  Treaty.  (For  text  of  agreements,  see 
European Community 89,  page  1.) 
The agreements were concluded, Mr. Rey 
said,  "by the  qualified representatives of our 
governments.  Never did  we  recognize  these 
agreements  in which  we  had  no  hand.  We 
did not participate in those Council meetings. 
We  first  learned of them in the  press ....  " 
The  Council later sent copies  of the  agree-
ments to the Commission but decided not to 
discuss them with the Commission until after 
the merger of the executive bodies of the three 
Communities, which took place in July 1967. 
After being named President of the merged 
Commission, Mr. Rey said he had discussed 
his views with his colleagues who agreed that 
they  "couldn't agree  to  begin  discussion  on 
the  basis of this heptalogue which  was  con-
nected with  an executive of which we  were 
not a part and under political circumstances 
which  belonged  to  the  past. ... We  have 
always  treated  these  agreements  as  if  they 
had no relation to us, to the point that, in our 
statement of July  1,  we  asked-in a  rather 
direct allusion to the Luxembourg agreements 
-that freedom to make decisions by majority 
vote  in  conformity  with  the  Treaty  be  re-
stored in the Council." 
"The heptalogue remained in the drawer," 
said Mr. Rey. "Discussion between the Coun-
cil and us did not begin ....  This heptalogue 
is a document of the past that wisdom orders 
left there." 
Mr.  Rey  pointed  out,  however,  that  the 
Treaty provides  for  majority  decisions  only 
in  certain instances.  For example,  decisions 
affecting  national  legislation  must  be  made 
unanimously under Article  100  of the Rome 
Treaty creating the European Economic Com-
munity. 
Djime Momar  Gueye, Ambassador of Senegal,  presents his  credentials to the  President of the  European  Communities Commission.  The 
Luxembourg agreements  stipulated  that  letters of credence  be  presented to both the  President of the  Council and the  President of the 
Commission meeting together for this purpose. Left to right: Ambassador Gueye; Mr. Kasel,  protocol officer; Henri Rochereau, member of 
the  Commission; Raymond Rifflet,  executive assistant  to  President  Rey;  Gian-Paolo  Papa;  Commission  President  Jean  Rey;  and  Axel 
Herbst, Director-General of External Relations. 
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INVESTMENT DECLINING IN ECSC INDUSTRIES; 
OXYGEN-STEEL TO ACCOUNT FOR 44% OF 1971 CAPACITY 
Investment  in  the  European  Community's 
coal, iron, and steel industries again declined 
in  1967,  according  to  the  annual  survey  of 
investments  published in  July  by  the  Euro-
pean Communities Commission. The decline 
followed  a  trend  established  since  1960  for 
coal and since 1963 for iron and steel, as the 
table  indicates. 
Investment in  coal  and steel  during  1968 
will increase by 16 per cent of the 1967 figure 
to  reach $1.18  billion.  Predictions of invest-
ment are based on declarations filed with the 
Commission by manufacturers, as required by 
the Paris Treaty creating the European Coal 
and Steel  Community. 
The Commission anticipates a slight rise in 
investment in iron-ore and coal mining. Capi-
tal investment in mining now represents less 
than 25  per cent of total investments in  the 
ECSC industries, whereas in  1954-59  it was 
about half. 
The decrease  in  iron-ore  mining capacity 
should amount to 2.7 million tons in 1967-71. 
According  to  the collieries'  investment  dec-
larations,  annual  coal  production  capacity 
will  contract  by  24  million  metric  tons  in 
1967-71,  to 186  million tons.  However,  this 
contraction  would  not necessarily lower the 
coal  surplus,  in  view  of the  rapid  decrease 
in demand, according to the Commission. 
In  the  manufacturing  sector,  production 
of sinter  and pig-iron  should expand  by  10 
per cent by 1971, while crude steel production 
should expand by  11  per cent,  to reach  124 
million tons in 1971.  Most of the increase in 
steel capacity would be due to the increased 
use  of  the  oxygen  method  of steel-making 
which  would  account for 44 per cent of ca-
pacity by 1971, as compared with 28 per cent 
in  1967. 
INVESTMENT BY ECSC INDUSTRIES  in millions of dollars  Forecast 
Sector  1954-59*  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
Mining 
Coal  439  377  384  372  334  299  286  254  246  251 
Iron-ore  39  43  52  47  28  24  25  17  16  24 
Manufacturing 
Iron and steel  581  775  1123  1230  1480  1315  932  848  750  905 
Total  1059  1195  1559  1649  1842  1638  1243  1119  1012  1180 
*annual averages 
NEW ITALIAN ROAD OF ENTRY GIVEN EIB AID 
The Autostrada dei Fiori, the first Italian road 
of entry that does not cross the Alps, will be 
built with assistance from the  European In-
vestment Bank. 
The  road,  connecting  the  French  border 
with San Remo,  will cost $55.4 million;  the 
Bank will supply $16 million. The loan con-
tract was signed in Brussels on July  18  with 
Autostrada dei Fiori S.p.A. The road, sched-
uled to open in 1969, forms part of the Euro-
pean  E-1  system  connecting  London  with 
Palermo via Paris, Nice, Genoa, and Rome. 
On July 17, the Bank signed another loan 
contract, of $4 million with the Syndical des 
Eaux du  Barrage d'Esch-sur-Sure  (SEBES)  of 
Luxembourg.  SEBES will  use  the proceeds of 
the  loan  to  finance  the  construction  of  a 
water  treatment  station,  two  reservoirs  for 
treated water, and forty miles of water mains 
in Luxembourg at a cost of $21.2 million. 
ECSC CONGRESS STUDIES 
STEEL UNDER STRESS 
Steel  under  extreme  chemical  and  physical 
stress  was  the  topic  of  the  fourth  Interna-
tional Steel Congress sponsored by the Euro-
pean Community. 
Four hundred private and government ex-
perts from fourteen countries met in Luxem-
bourg  for  the  conference  held  July  9-11. 
Technical  papers  were  delivered  and  dis-
cussed in four workshops, one on the theory 
and one on the practical aspects of chemical 
attack  on steel,  the  third  on  the  effects  of 
high  polyaxial  pressures  on  steel,  and  the 
fourth on stress and strain on steel caused by 
high and low temperatures. 
Jean Rey, President of the European Com-
munities  Commission,  addressed the partici-
pants.  Now that both the chemical  and the 
steel industries have large markets in  which 
to operate, they must be given the means to 
do so, by creating a mechanism to allow the 
formation  of European-scale companies,  he 
said. 
Guido  Colonna  di  Paliano,  member  of 
the Commission with special responsibility for 
industrial  policy,  urged  Europeans  to  "re-
nounce all conservatism in business manage-
ment to create a favorable climate for innova-
tion. This is  essentially a political problem," 
he added, "which involves mainly the public 
authorities." 
Construction on the  Trans-Cameroon 
railroad financed  in  part by the  European 
Development Fund. STRIKES, INFLATION  SWELL U.S.  IMPORTS FROM COMMON MARKET 
U.S. imports from the Common Market in-
creased sharply in the first  quarter of 1968. 
The European Communities Commission at-
tributed  the  rise  largely  to  inflation  in  the 
United States and to the fact that American 
buyers hedged against a steel strike later this 
year. 
According  to  the  second  quarterly  Eco-
nomic Survey of 1968 released by the Com-
mission in Brussels on July 15, the Common 
Market's  exports  to  the  United  States  were 
41.5  per cent higher than at the same time 
last year. The increase still left the Commu-
nity with a deficit in its balance of trade with 
the United States. Community imports from 
the  United  States  came  to  $1,501,000,000, 
while  exports  in  the  first  quarter  came  to 
$1,424,000,000. 
The Community's total exports in the first 
quarter of 1968 amounted to $8,577,300,000, 
while imports totaled $8,104,700,000. Strong 
export demand persisted through June, con-
tributing to the general recovery of the Com-
munity's economy.  In view of the tariff cuts 
made on  July  1,  as  agreed  in  the  Kennedy 
Round  of  negotiations  under  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade last year, the 
Commission  expects  imports  to  increase 
markedly in  1968. 
Outlook for Remainder of 1968 
Gross Community product would expand by 
I  5  per cent  this  year,  the  Commission  esti-
DAC MEMBERS INCREASE AID TO DEVELOPING  NATIONS 
BUT  MISS  1%  OF  NATIONAL  INCOME  TARGET 
The  seventeen  participants  in  the  Develop-
ment  Assistance  Committee  (DAC)  contrib-
uted  $11.4 billion in financial  and technical 
aid to developing countries during 1967, $800 
million more than in 1966. Despite this 8 per 
cent increase, the total net flow  of resources 
from rich to poor countries amounted to .94 
per cent of the  DAC  members' combined na-
tional  incomes.  This percentage  however  is 
below the target of I  per cent of national in-
come set by the DAC in 1965. 
DAC, a specialized committee of the Organi-
zation for  Economic Development,  released 
these figures in Paris on July 4 in its annual 
report  on  development  assistance.  DAC  par-
ticipants are:  the Commission of the  Euro-
pean  Communities,  Belgium,  France,  Ger-
many,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, 
Portugal,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  (Luxem-
bourg  is  the  only  European  Community 
member that does  not  belong  to  the  DAC.) 
I 
Four  Community  members  of  DAC  sur-
passed the 1 per cent goal: France ( 1.64 per 
cent),  Germany  ( 1.26  per  cent),  Belgium 
( 1.01  per cent), and  the Netherlands  ( 1.24 
percent). The United Kingdom and Portugal, 
the  only  other  DAC  members  to  exceed  the 
goal, gave respectively 1.10 per cent and 1.07 
I per cent of their national incomes. Although  I  U.S.  aid represented only .85  per cent of na-
l  tiona! income, it was the largest amount given 
1 by  any single country. 
I 
France and the Netherlands also surpassed 
the  new  target  for  aid  between  1967  and 
. 1975, contributing 1.24 per cent and 1.01  per 
1 
cent of gross  national product,  respectively. 
The new  goal,  1 per cent of gross  national 
product, set last spring by the second United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment,  effectively  raises  the  level  of aid  ex-
! pected by  25  per cent. 
.  Flows of private  funds  to  the  developing 
i countries, though a  volatile part of develop-
ment aid, has accounted for a more important 
AID  BY  DAC  MEMBERS  rin millions of dollars! 
1966  1967 
Official  Private  Total  Official  Private  Total 
Belgium  81.1  96.9  178  98.8  54.6 11)  153 (1) 
France  744.8  574.9  1,320  831.1  512.8  1,344 
Germany  489.7  248.2  738  549.4  593.6  1,143 
Italy  121.9  509.7  632  202.8  66.3  269 
Netherlands  93.9  160.2  254  113.5  113.5  227 
Community 
Total  1,531.4  1,589.9  3,122  1,795.6  1,340.8  3,136 
United Kingdom  525.9  499.6  1,026  499.8  480.2  980 
United States  3,660.0  1,323.0  4,983  3,723.0  ( 1,844.0)  (5,567) (2) 
Other  DAC  789.0  643.5  1,431  (951.6)  725.0  1,677 
TOTAL  6,506.3  4,056.0  10,562  (6,970.0)  ( 4,390.0)  ( 11,360) 121 
( 1) excludes reinvested earnings (2)  estimate 
mated,  but noted that forecasts did not take 
into account the effects of the recent strikes 
in France. Statistics in the  report cover the 
first  quarter and the analysis pertains to the 
state of the economy through mid-May, prior 
to the strikes. 
Export demand would weaken, as "special 
factors" that had caused such a steep rise in 
the first quarter disappeared, the Commission 
said.  Internal demand would strengthen,  es-
pecially for private consumer goods and ma-
terial to replenish stocks. Both production and 
imports would expand more rapidly than in 
the first  quarter. Imports of consumer goods 
and  industrial  equipment,  in  particular, 
I  would progress sharply. 
part of total financing  in  1965-67  than they 
did in the early  sixties.  Most of these funds 
are in the form of direct and portfolio invest-
ments and export credits. 
Two-thirds  of  all  government  assistance 
was given in the form of grants and loans, 89 
per  cent of them disbursed  bilaterally.  The 
other  official  assistance  was  channeled 
through  multilateral  agencies  such  as  the 
I  World  Bank.  Switzerland  was  the  only  DAC 
1 member  to  disburse  all  development  aid 
1 through multilateral agencies, the report said. 
i 
I 
BOOK  REVIEW 
I 
!  The  European  Common  Market  and  the 
i  World. By Werner Feld. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
!  Englewood  Cliffs,  New  Jersey,  1967.  184 
I  :pages. 
i 
i A  study  of the  Common Market's  external 
i  relations.  The  author  focuses  first  on  the 
i general problems of external  policy  formu-
lation,  examining  the  competencies  of  the 
· ~ ·  European  Community  to  engage  in  rela-
tions  with  non-member  states  and  inter-
national  organizations.  Mr.  Feld  then  dis-
1
.  cusses the substance of the Common Market's 
, relations  with  the  world  in  terms  of  past 
events,  current  activities,  and  likely  future 
moves. He supplements his study with a sur-
vey  of attitudes  and  views  held by officials 
i of  influential  interest  groups,  political  par-
. ties,  and pertinent government ministries  in 
the  member  states  on  future  relations  be-
tween  the  Community  and  the  world.  For-
1 eign policy, the author notes, has traditionally 
I been a  jealously guarded sphere of national 
1 sovereignity.  The bold step of the Common 
: Market  Treaty  drafters  to  transfer  certain 
' foreign-policy  making  powers  from  the  na-
tional governments to the  Common Market 
organs has "understandably" created tensions 
1 and stress in the Community system, he says. .... 
The 
-European 
Community  , 
.~  . . 
European Community Information Serv-
'ice,  Brussels/ Luxembourg,  1967,  8~ x 
11  inches,  color,  _FREE 
This kit is available in bulk. 
It  contains twelve maps. 
•  Administrative Regions and Units 
•  Density of Population 
•  Agriculture  I:  Land  Utilization  and 
Main Crops 
•  Agriculture II: Livestock and Fishing 
•  Energy 
•  Nuclear Industry 
•  Industry I: Iron and Steel and 
Selected Branches of Engineering 
•  Industry II: Major Industrial Regions 
and Distribution of Manpower by 
Activities 
•  Transport I: Railways and Navigation 
•  Transport II: Roads and Civil Aviation 
•  External Trade 
•  Associated Overseas States and 
Territories 
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